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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELFIN E. ORTEGA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 9709 
PERRY A. THOMAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S RE'PL Y BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS ASSIGNMENT 
OF ERROR TO THE COURT'S VERDICT-DIRECTING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
Respondent in his Point III (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 3), alleges that the defendant and appel-
lant took no exception to a ''explanatory instruc-
tion" and thereby "irrevocably put aside his claim 
of error by stipulating that it be given." Since the 
premise upon which the respondent bases this alle-
gation is not supported by the record, a review of 
pertinent facts is necessary. 
The jury had deliberated more than seven hours 
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when they sought assistance from the court con-
cerning the meaning of Instructions No. 12 and 14. 
(First Additional Record, filed November 6, 1962.) 
Thererafter, the court gave the following in-
struction upon stipulation of counsel. 
"The instructions you ask about do set 
out the law applicable to the opposite theories 
of each case of each party. You should follow 
the instruction which you think is supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence." 
(First Additional Record, page 2.) 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, 
plaintiff's attorney contended that the defendant 
had waived his right to object to the "explanatory 
instruction". The following comments by the court 
are taken from the record : 
"THE COURT: The Court knows that 
both counsel were acting in good faith. Both 
counsel actually wanted to win their lawsuits, 
but at the same time they wanted to present 
error-free instructions and see that error-free 
procedure was followed at all tin1e'S. Of course, 
in looking back now, by hindsight, of course, 
there may have been things we all would have 
decided differently at that time. But I think 
th!at both parties, for that matter, took ade-
quate exception, and I felt all the exceptions 
that were taken by Mr. Hanson, certainly 
preserved his right to argue this point and 
to appeal them, because I think the exceptions 
as he has. argued them here this morning, 
and the points of law were certainly properly 
excepted to at the trial, and they are proper-
ly before the court. \There is no question about 
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that. The Court doesn't think he waived any-
thing by helping to draft or consenting that 
the last clarifying instruction was [sic] given 
to the jury. I don't think that in any way 
prejudiced Mr. Hanson's right to make his 
motion, or his right to appeal." 
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, pp. 28 
and 29.) 
Counsel for the plaintiff persisted in urging 
his theory of waiver upon the court. The record 
then records the following: 
"THE COURT: Of course, Mr. Hanson 
has 'already objected to the instruction given. 
"'MR. KING: But the fact apparently 
was completely-
"THE COURT: I think the error, if any, 
had been committed and I don't think any-
thing we could have done at that time would 
have helped." 
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, p. 31.) 
The reasons the giving of Instruction No. 12 
constituted error are set forth in Appellant's Brief, 
Point I, page 4. It i's pertinent to observe however, 
that when the "clarifying instruction" was given 
the error had already occurred, and the jury had 
been wrestling with it for seven hours. The time 
to have corrected that error was before the instruc-
tions were read to the jury, when a proper excep-
tion had been taken, rather than attempt clarifi-
cation after the jury was plunged into the conflict 
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which existed between Instruction No. 12 and No. 
14. These two instructions were irreconcilable. To 
accept one was to reject the other. The fact that 
the jury could not reconcile them bespeaks the 
thoroughness with which they undertook their charge 
and affirms the validity of the objection which hrad 
been made to those instructions by defendant. The 
"clarifying" instruction did not clarify, it merely 
informed the jury to consider the case on the basis 
it had been submitted to them. 'The error remained 
and their dilemma continued. 
It was incumbent upon the court to properly 
state the law. The defendant should not be pen1al-
ized for hi's attempt to assist the court in eliminat-
ing an error which had been made, and proper ex-
ception reserved. 
'The right to alter the instructions, or to give 
additional instruction was, of course, within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge. The court real-
ized th!at after the jury had been considering the 
conflict between these instructions for such a period 
of time that any attempt to correct them by patch-
work would draw undue attention to the revised 
instruction and create further prejudice. Under the 
circumrstances the court probably did all it could 
do to avoid additional error. 
The court in seeking ·counsel's assistance in pre-
paring a clarifying instruction understood and stat-
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ed that neither of the parties "waived anything", 
and that the defendant's right to take an appeal 
on the originally assigned error was preserved. 
(Transcript, Motion for New Trial, p. 29.) 
The clear implication of plaintiff's argument 
is that the presence of opposing counsel 'at a time 
when the plaintiff was urging error upon the court, 
not only condoned the error but waived any right 
to object to it. The record is plain that a proper 
objection was taken to Instruction No. 12 and was 
continued at every point in the proceedings. 
It is, of course, the responsibility of the pl'ain-
tiff as well as defendant to assist the court in giv-
ing proper instructions and to refrain from com-
mitting error. However, plaintiff suggests that be-
cause defendant was not successful in persuading 
the court to avoid error, against his own arguments 
to the contrary, defendant cannot now complain, 
but has in effect, waived his right to appeal. Surely, 
defendant's counsel cannot be expected to be more 
diligent in plaintiff's cause than is his own counsel. 
Plaintiff presented the misleading in'struetion and 
urged the court to ~adopt it, which was done, against 
the specific objection of the defendant. 
The plaintif contends that the defendant ''irre-
vocably" put aside his claim of error by stipulating 
that the explanatory instruction be given. Plaintiff 
then cites several cases which he as~serts affirm 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that proposition. None of the cases are helpful. In 
McCall v. McKendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 374 P.2d 
962, the complaining party failed to take any ob-
jection whatsoever to the instructions given. He 
requeste~ permission to state an objection on ap-
peal ~ and was denied. Similarly, in Devine 
v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 27 4 P.2d 1073, the ob-
jections taken were not explicit; nevertheless, the 
court found that they were sufficient. In the case 
of Ludlow v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway, 73 
Utah 513, 275 Pac. 593, the question was not even 
discussed. Neither does State v. Kesler, 1'5 Uta:h 143, 
49 Pac. 293, treat the problem. Although, 53 Am. 
Jur. 'Tri1al Sec. 513 contains a general discussion of 
Instructions given after submission of a case to a 
jury, it is not helpful here. 
, No case is cited by the plaintiff which supports 
the proposition that a defendant waives or puts 
aside any claim of error by stipulating to a speci'al 
instru'ction given to the jury 1at their request in the 
face of a reservation of the objection to the prior 
instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
APPEAL FROM: A RULING CONCERNING A DEC-
LARATION OF THE COURT THAT A POLTCE OF-
FICE'R WAS AN EXPERT 'WITNESS. 
The plain tiff and respondent in his brief ( p. 
13), asserts that since the defendant did not argue on 
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motion for new b·ial that certain remarks of the 
court were prejudicial, such assertion cannot no·w 
be urged on appeal. In support of this position the 
plaintiff cites the case of Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 
394, 408, 409, 410, 98 Pac. 300. 
In that case an appeal was taken directly from 
a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The basis of 
the appeal was challenged because the claimed errors 
had not been presented to the trial court on motion 
for a new trial. The court, in discussing appellate 
procedure stated: 
'~The right to move for a new trial is 
present in every case, whether legal or equit-
able, or whether tried to a court or jury. If 
a party thinks he can convince the trial court 
that it committed a judicial error and will 
grant him a new trial without an appeal, he 
may make his motion and obtain a ruling 
upon it; but, when he has obtained one ruling 
from the court and has taken or is given a 
statutory exception, he need not require the 
court to repeat the error before he is entitled 
to a review of the error by this court . . . . 
If the trial court has passed upon a matter 
in the course of trial and an exception is taken 
or is given by the statute, the ruling or de-
cision made by the trial court, if assigned as 
error, is before this court for review on ap-
peal . . . any other holding would bring about 
the incongruity of requiring the trial court to 
pass twice on some matters, while it may do 
so but once on others. 
* * * 
"From what has been said it necessarily fol-
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lows that all orders, rulings and decisions 
made by the trial court during the trial . ... 
are before this court for review without a 
motion for a new trial." (Emphasis added.) 
It is only in those cases where a rna tter arises 
following trial that it must be brought to the at-
tention of the trial court by way of a motion for 
a new trial, and the trial court given an opportunity 
to pass upon the matter, before an appeal lies. 'The 
case so holds. 
The right to appeal as stated in Rule 72, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, contains no such limita-
tions as suggested by respondent. 
As plainly appears from the record, (T. 133-
136), and as cited at page 19 of Appellant's Brief, 
the defendant properly objected to the comment 
of the court, the matter was then discussed 
in chambers and the objection was clearly reserved. 
The trial court passed upon defendant's ob-
jection during the course of trial and the correct-
ness of that ruling is properly before this court for 
review. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant and appellant did not waive any 
right of appeal by stipulating to a ''clarifying in-
struction" given by the court after the case had 
been submitted to the jury. Further, a ruling made 
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by the Court during the course of trial is properly 
before this court on appeal without submitting it 
for review on Motion for a New Trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
515 Kearns Buiding 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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